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Phillips curves and natural rates of unemployment provide a poor
foundation for analyzing ination in developing economies. Structural-
ist alternatives have focused on distributional conict and cross-sectoral
interactions, but if the distributional claims are exogenous, the theory has
formal similarities with mainstream analysis, generating a natural rate of
underemployment. This paper outlines a modied structuralist model in
which historically determined distributional claims eliminate this natural
rate of underemployment. Economic development and structural trans-
formation are not blocked by immutable distributional claims, but shocks
to relative incomes can produce explosive ination.
Key words: Phillips curve, underemployment, distributional conict,
structuralist model
JEL numbers: E31, O23
1 Introduction
The original Phillips curve described an empirical regularity in UK data for
a hundred-year period, and the same pattern  a negative relation between
unemployment and the rate of ination was found in post-war data for many
countries. Low unemployment, it seemed, causes wage pressures and rising
nominal wages.
The existence of a long-run tradeo¤ between unemployment and ination
was questioned theoretically by Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968), while ob-
servations in the late 1960s and 1970s presented an empirical challenge in the
form of upward shifts in the relation between unemployment and ination. The
expectations-augmented Phillips was born and with it the notion of a nat-
ural rate of unemployment. The quest for explicit microeconomic foundations
gave rise to a new variation, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, built on menu
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costs and a stochastic timing of price adjustments. Unfortunately, as noted by
Mankiw (2001, p. C52),
Although the new Keynesian Phillips curve has many virtues, it
also has one striking vice: It is completely at odds with the facts.
In particular, it cannot come even close to explaining the dynamic
e¤ects of monetary policy on ination and unemployment.
More traditional or eclectic Phillips curves fare better than strict New Keynesian
formulations, and Blanchard (2016) goes so far as to suggest that the Phillips
curve is "alive and well" (p. 31). That seems exaggerated, however. Using
US data, Blanchard estimates a two-equation system in which the parameters
as well as the natural rate of unemployment are allowed to follow constrained
random walks. The estimated parameters exhibit dramatic changes, but despite
these parameter changes "the t of the relation remains fairly poor" (p. 33).
Whatever one may think about the Phillips curve for rich economies, notions
of natural rates of unemployment notion begs additional questions in relation to
developing economies. Japan after the second world war, Korea a few years later
and China since the 1980s did not uctuate around steady growth paths with
unemployment at some natural rate. With hidden unemployment and plenty
of scope for technological catchup, economic development was not constrained
by the growth of the labor force and the pace of technological change in these
economies. Instead, policy intervention helped shift the economy to a steeper
growth path with a rapid decline in underemployment.
Any presumptions of a stable relation between rates of unemployment and
(levels or changes of) ination would seem suspect for developing economies.
The o¢ cial unemployment rate for India has hovered below 5 percent and Mex-
ico routinely has unemployment rates that are among the lowest in the OECD.
These o¢ cial numbers say very little about the extent of underemployment; the
growth of the modern sector in India and Mexico is not hampered by a short-
age of workers. There may be temporary shortages of particular skills, but the
evidence suggests that large numbers of underemployed workers in the informal
sectors have skills that are comparable to those of formal-sector workers and that
formal-sector jobs pay better and are seen as highly attractive (La Porta and
Shleifer 2014).1 All economies have sectoral di¤erences, but the sectoral di¤er-
ences have a di¤erent order of magnitude in developing economies; development
itself is a process of structural transformation in which low-income workers in
informal sectors gradually move into better jobs in the formal sectors. Thus,
although it may often be reasonable to treat high income countries as mature
and ignore sectoral di¤erences, most low and middle income countries are dual
economieswith profound sectoral di¤erences that should not be ignored.
1Partly because of data limitations, the empirical literature on Phillips curves in developing
countries is relatively sparse. The evidence, however, does not support the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (e.g. Maka and Barbosa (2010) for the case of Brazil) while Bleaney and
Francisco (2017) nd that for low- and middle-income countries the coe¢ cient on the output
gap is statistically insignifcant in most of their regressions.
2
These empirical observations create a puzzle: despite large amounts of in-
voluntary underemployment many developing economies have experienced high
rates of ination. This is the case not least in Latin America where structural-
ist explanations have focused on the interaction between bottlenecks that create
price increases in particular sectors and propagation mechanisms that spread the
price increases and lead to general ination (Noyola 1956, Sunkel 1958, Seers
1962); Ros (2013, chapter 12) presents a useful formalization.
With an inelastic supply of agricultural goods a bottleneck an expansion
of the modern sector and the associated increase in the demand for agricultural
output leads to increases in the price of food and squeezes the consumption real
wage. Workers try to defend their consumption real wage and react a propaga-
tion mechanism by demanding increases in the money wages. As money wages
rise, monopolistic rms raise the prices of modern sector goods to maintain a
constant markup, and the increase in prices and wages in the modern sector
now feeds back into higher nominal demand for agricultural output. Agricul-
tural prices rise further, leading to a new round of wage and price increases.
The combination of bottlenecks (an inelastic supply of agricultural output) and
propagation mechanisms (distributional conict) has set the stage for explosive
ination.
Inelastic supplies of wage goods, especially agricultural output, were identi-
ed as an important source of ination, but other bottlenecks could in principle
play the same role. A high income elasticity of imports, for instance, could
necessitate a depreciation of the currency to avoid balance of payments prob-
lems if domestic demand increases; a depreciated currency reduces domestic real
wages; distributional conict generates inationary pressures and the need for
further depreciation to restore international competitiveness (see Ros 2013, sec-
tion 12.3). Foreign trade, capital mobility and the balance of payments are of
great importance in most developing countries. In this paper, however, I shall
use a simpler, closed-economy setting to examine basic inationary mechanisms.
The structuralist story  rightly, in my view  emphasizes distributional
conict and interactions between sectors. But most basic agricultural goods
are tradable, and in many countries it seems implausible to designate inelastic
agricultural supply as an important bottleneck. Particularly for middle income
countries like Mexico and Brazil, second, underemployment is increasingly to be
found in informal urban sectors, rather than in agriculture. The specication of
the distributional aspirations that lie behind the propagation mechanisms, third,
may not be fully convincing, and this specication is central to the results.
The stylized two-sector, closed-economy model in section 2 reects two of
these concerns. The delineation of sectors is di¤erent and the specication of
demand has been modied compared to the structuralist model in Ros (2013,
section 12.2). The third concern will be addressed in section 3 which endogenizes
wage aspirations and distributional claims. Section 4 summarizes the main
conclusions.
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2 A modied structuralist model
2.1 Assumptions
A modern, formal sector produces an output M using a Leontief technology,
M = minfqLM ; Kg = qLM (1)
LM and K denote modern-sector employment and capital. There is excess
capital capacity, and labor productivity q grows at a constant rate. A constant
markup (1+m) implies that the prot share, , is constant, and if wM and pM
are the wages and prices in the sector, we have




wMLM = (1  )pMM (3)
The second sector, which has labor as its only input, is not a subsistence
sector. It produces a variety of goods and services, and workers in the informal
sector have to sell these goods and services, e.g. as day laborers, street vendors,
domestic workers or employees in small corner shops and construction activities.
Workers who fail to get a job in the modern sector move into the informal sector:
LA = N   LM (4)
where N is the total labor force. The informal sector may contain small-scale
businesses that make a prot but, for simplicity, it is assumed that all incomes in
the informal sector go to workers. Thus, if pA and wA are the price of A goods
and the average income in the sector (the wage rate, for short), we have
pAA = wALA (5)
Workers in both sectors spend their income on consumption while all prots
are saved. Thus, aggregate nominal consumption (C) is given by
C = pMCM + pACA = wALA + wMLM (6)
where CA and CM denote real consumption of goods from the two sectors.
Nominal consumption is split between formal and informal goods, the proportion
 of consumption expenditure going to the formal sector. Thus,
pMCM = C (7)
pACA = (1  )C (8)
The informal sector produces a pure consumption good, and the equilibrium
condition requires that
A = CA (9)
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where A is the real output of the representative good produced by the informal
sector. Formal-sector goods can be used for investment or consumption, and
the equilibrium condition is given by
M = I(M;K; r) + CM (10)
Investment demand depends on the real rate of interest (r), the level of out-
put and the predetermined capital stock; this specication includes investment
functions that relate the accumulation rate to the utilization rate of capital as
a special case.
Turning to wage formation in the formal sector, it is assumed that workers
wage aspirations, wTM , are proportional to the average income in the informal
sector,
wTM = wA;  > 1 (11)
where  > 1 represents the target wage premium in the formal sector. This
specication of wage targets may invite objections. Formal-sector workers can-
not directly observe incomes in the informal sector. They get imperfect signals,
however, from direct conversations with family, friends and neighbors as well
as from observable consumption behavior the purchase of a new TV or dress
by an acquaintance, for instance, or the ordering of more extravagant snacks
in the neighborhood bar. Second, the incomes of, for instance, street peddlers
may not inuence the wage aspirations of high-skill, relatively well-paid work-
ers in the formal sector directly; if they inuence the aspirations and wages of
low-skill retail workers in the formal sector, however, there will be a cascade
of derived e¤ects for other formal-sector workers. The specication in equation
(11) represents a two-sector approximation to these ripple e¤ects of changes in
the conditions of workers in the informal sector.2 For simplicity, third, the wage
aspirations in equation (11) have been related exclusively to informal sector
incomes. The specication could be extended to include a dependence on prof-
itability in the formal sector. With a constant markup, however, this extension
would not change much.3
Nominal wage ination responds to deviations of actual wages from the tar-
get and may incorporate, analogously to an accelerationist Phillips curve, the




  1) + x (12)
2Relative wage norms and relative social positions are often connected with race, gender
or other social divisions. These important issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
3As a simple formalization, equation (11) could be replaced by
wTM = wA + g()wM ; g > 0; g(0) < 0 < g(1) (*)
Unlike informal-sector incomes which are endogenously determined, the prot share can be
treated as exogenous. If it is constant, the more general specication in (*) does not alter the
qualitative properties in this and the next section. The exposition, however, is simplied by
excluding a direct inuence of the prot share on the wage target.
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where x denotes the expected growth rate of average incomes in the informal
sector and  is the speed of adjustment in response to gaps between target and
actual wages in the formal sector. Expectations are assumed to follow a simple
adaptive process,
_x = (ŵA   x) (13)
To get from wage ination in the formal sector to the general rate of price
ination, suppose that general price ination is related to the rate of price
ination in the modern sector. For simplicity, let
p̂ = (p̂M ); 
0 > 0 (14)
where p the general price level. By assumption the markup in the formal sector
is constant, and if labor productivity in the formal sector grows at the rate q̂,
equation (2) implies that
p̂ = (ŵM   q̂) (15)
2.2 Implications
Informal-sector demand and relative wages Total informal sector income
can be found by combining the consumption equations with the equilibrium
condition for the informal sector (equations (5)-(9)):


















 = LM=(N  LM ) is the ratio of formal-sector employment to the labor
force in the informal sector.
Sectoral employment shares An ination-targeting central bank sets an in-
ation target p̂T , which translates into a target for wage ination in the formal
sector (equation (15)). A constant value of ŵM in turn pins down the sectoral
composition of workers the value of 
 that is consistent with income expec-
tations being met. To see this, note that if expectations are met, then x = ŵA
and both x and ŵA will be constant (equation (13)). Using equation (12) it now
follows that




The left hand side of this equation is constant, but the right hand side can only
be constant if ŵM = ŵA: This condition in turn implies (using equations (17)
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and (using equations (13), (17) and (11)-(12))
_x = (ŵA   x) = (




  1) > 0 (21)
Using equation (12) it follows that wage ination in the formal sector would
increase steadily and without limit.
Equations (19)-(20) express necessary conditions for successful ination tar-
geting. The required value of M (M IT ) can be found by combining equations
(1) and (20) to get




1 +  1 
N (22)
The implications of this requirement for the interest rate can be seen by noting




LM = (1  )M
With M determined by equation (22), the equilibrium condition for the formal
sector equation (10) now implies that






N;K and q are predetermined and to maintain a constant target rate of ination,
central banks must adjust the (real) interest rate r to satisfy equation (23).
Underemployment It still remains to determine the degree of underemploy-
ment. Aggregate income in the informal sector is demand determined, but
equation (16) says nothing about whether this income is achieved through low
prices, high real output and low degrees of underemployment or through high
prices, low output and high degrees of underemployment. No assumptions about
the technology in the informal sector were needed, moreover, to derive equations
(20) and (22).
As a simple benchmark, assume that there is constant returns to labor in
the informal sector but that workers may be underemployed; a street vendor
may spend most of her time waiting for customers and day laborers may fail to
nd work on most days. Formally, normalizing labor productivity to one when
there is no underemployment, let
A = eLA (24)
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where e is the e¤ective employment rateand (1   e) measures the degree of
underemployment in the informal sector.
For some workers in the informal sector, including day laborers and domestic
workers, the quality of the work and the e¢ ciency with which the worker carries
out the task may depend on the wage (on the price that is being paid for the
service if the worker is self-employed). In these cases an e¢ ciency wage argument
may determine the real wage (price), suggesting that the (representative) price
of informal sector goods and services will be proportional to the (representative)
price of formal goods:4
pA = pM (25)
The e¢ ciency-wage argument has less appeal with respect to other workers in
the informal sector; street vendors, for instance. For present purposes, however,
we may take equation (25) as a benchmark assumption to close the model and
determine the degree of underemployment; the assumption implies that b0 = 0
and b1 = 1 in equation (14).
Using equations (5), (24) and (25), we have
wA = epA = epM















Conicting income claims wage setting in the modern sector interacting with
demand-determined incomes in the informal sector  pin down the share of
modern-sector employment, as shown by equation (20). A large wage premium
in the formal sector (a high relative-wage demand ) implies a small modern sec-
tor and a large informal sector. Structural transformation is blocked or more
accurately, the expansion of the modern sector will create explosive ination in
the absence of institutional changes or policy interventions that weaken work-
ersbargaining strength. In this respect the model depicts a dual economy that
4The specication of consumption demand is consistent with a Cobb-Douglas utility func-




M ) if labor
productivity is normalized to one. It follows that
pA = !
1=pM
The proportionality between pA and pM now follows if ! is constant (determined by the
e¢ ciency wage argument).
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is quite similar to the economies described by standard models of natural un-
employment. Mainstream economists, the OECD and other organizations have
long prescribed labor market reformas the solution to high unemployment.
This model suggests a similar policy prescription for developing economies: la-
bor market reforms that reduce the power and wage aspirations of formal-sector
workers may be needed to allow a non-inationary expansion of the modern
sector.
Distributional conict also determines the degree of underemployment, which
reinforces the similarity with the natural rate hypothesis. The employment rate
in the informal sector is decreasing in the share claimed by prots (), formal
sector workers relative income target () and the e¢ ciency real wage in the
informal sector () (see equation (26)). The overall rate of underemployment,
u, is
u = (1  e)LA=N =
+    1

1  
+ (1  ) (27)
This overall rate of underemployment is increasing in ;  and . Depending
on parameters, underemployment may be large, but there is a striking formal
similarity with mainstream macroeconomics: the model e¤ectively produces a
natural rate of underemployment. As in the mainstream model, the natural
rate is determined by wage and price setting. Upward shifts in income claims
exacerbate the distributional conict, and distributional conicts are resolved
by increases in unemployment that squeeze workerspower and aspirations. Not
surprisingly, the overall rate of underemployment also depends of the compo-
sition of demand. The informal sector shrinks and underemployment falls if
demand shifts towards formal-sector goods; formally, u is decreasing in :
Comparing the model to the structuralist model in Ros (2013, section 12.2),
ination derives from mutually inconsistent distributional claims in both mod-
els. The primary source of inationary pressures is di¤erent, however. The
structuralist model described by Ros locates the inationary pressures in an
agricultural sector that produces an essential wage good and in which workers
must be paid some minimum product real wage. Agricultural employment is set
by prot maximizing landowners, and diminishing returns to labor and a xed
product real wage determine the supply of agricultural goods. This supply-side
determination of the agricultural surplus available for consumption by urban
workers in combination with a xed proportionality between the wages for em-
ployed workers in the two sectors now limits employment in the modern sector.
Attempts to increase the modern sector beyond this limit generates ination as
increased demand for agricultural goods comes up against an inelastic supply
and agricultural prices rise. Agriculture is the critical bottleneck, and there
is a clear policy implication: a boost to agricultural productivity allows the
expansion of both sectors.
In the modied version, by contrast, income claims wage demands and
prot markups in the modern sector are the primary source of ination. Wage
demands are linked to the average income in the informal sector, rather than to
the e¤ective wage rate wA=e for workers that experience no underemployment.
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The justication for this specication is straightforward. The average income
represents the fallback position for formal-sector workers who lose their job. It
is also the relevant measure for theories that link wage targets to fairness norms
for relative income what matters in the comparison of incomes presumably is
the actual income of street vendors and day laborers, not the income they could
have had if only demand for their services had been higher.
The modied model implies that the average income in the informal sector
can be determined without any reference to pricing and that no assumptions
are needed concerning returns to scale; constant returns to labor was used as
a plausible benchmark, but the determination in equation (20) of the employ-
ment share of the formal sector does not depend on this assumption. This
independence emerges because of a di¤erent specication of the composition of
consumption. In the Ros version workers spend all their income on basic con-
sumption goods produced by agriculture. The informal sector in the modied
version, by contrast, does not produce basic consumption goods. Low-income
workers in countries like Mexico and Brazil buy TVs, cell phones, food and
clothes that are not produced by the informal sector, while high-income house-
holds employ domestic workers and gardeners and buy street food on the way to
the o¢ ce. There are clearly di¤erences between rich and poor in the composition
of consumption, but the split between modern and informal sector goods may
not be very di¤erent. The benchmark version of the model therefore assumes
that a constant share of consumption expenditure goes to the informal sector.5
This assumption simplies the analysis but could be relaxed (see Martins and
Skott 2021).
The di¤erences between the two models have important implications. While
productivity increases in the agricultural sector allow the expansion of the mod-
ern sector in the standard version, the share of modern-sector employment con-
sistent with low ination is independent of informal-sector productivity in the
modied version. Low productivity in the informal sector, moreover, is largely
a demand problem. Street vendors would sell more and have higher produc-
tivity and income if only there were more buyers, while day laborers would be
happy if they could nd work every day. The problem is not an inelastic sup-
ply of informal goods or excessive wage demands from informal sector workers.
The expansion of the modern sector is curbed by the interaction between wage
demands in the formal sector and demand-determined average incomes in the
informal sector.
3 Endogenous aspirations and norms
3.1 Behavioral evidence and assumptions
The previous section reached conclusions that may seem both uncomfortable
and counterintuitive. Is it really the case that wage demands in the modern
5This specication of the composition of demand implies that the MM and LL curves
become vertical in Ros (2013, Figure 12.3, p. 268).
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sector block economic development in the absence of labor market reforms or
other interventions that weaken the workers in this sector?
Measurements of the informal sector are fraught with conceptual and practi-
cal di¢ culties. Informality in a legal sense is not what matters. Non-registered
rms that fail to pay taxes could in principle be highly e¢ cient and employ
workers that were well paid and that had no desire to move to the formal sec-
tor. Conversely, the formal registration of street peddlers would not make them
part of the modern sector. But measurement issues notwithstanding, the infor-
mal sector appears to be huge in most developing economies, and workers in
the formal sector typically enjoy a very large wage premium over the average
income in the informal sector.6 The implied cost of job lossfor formal-sector
workers would seem to be so large that standard explanations of the premium
become unconvincing, whether these explanations are based on the strength of
unions or Shapiro-Stiglitz type e¢ ciency wage models in which rms set wages
and intertemporally optimizing workers choose e¤ort to maximize a traditional
utility function dened over consumption and e¤ort. An alternative story is
needed.
Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) highlighted the importance of
reciprocity and norms of fairness for wage setting. Workers who feel they have
been treated badly will tend to reciprocate; morale and labor productivity will
su¤er and rms therefore have an incentive to pay fair wages. This fairness-
based account of wage setting is singled out by Bewley (1999) as the only one
out of a large set of candidates that is consistent with the empirical evidence
on wage stickiness in recessions. The story, it should be noted, can apply to
labor markets without collective bargaining and labor unions (as in Akerlof
and Yellen 1990) as well as to unionized labor markets; unfair wages induce
aggressive wage demands and steel the rank and le to ght for these demands
in a unionized economy. The precise forms may be di¤erent in unionized and
non-unionized settings, but the basic mechanism is the same: the perception of
fairness is important in wage setting.
Wage aspirations and norms of fairness are predetermined in the short run
but clearly di¤er across space and change over time. The real wage aspirations
of auto workers in Germany, the Czech Republic and India are quite di¤erent
while wages that were considered fair by VW workers in 1960 would be deemed
unacceptable in 2020. In short, wage aspirations are path dependent. Or as
Marx put it, the value of labor power has a "historical and moral element".7
6La Porta and Shleifer (2014, p. 110) summarize their ndings in ve facts:
we establish ve critical facts about the informal economy. First, it is huge,
especially in developing countries. Second, it has extremely low productivity
compared to the formal economy ... . Third, ... the productivity of informal
rms is too low for them to thrive in the formal sector. ... Fourth, ... [i]nformal
rms rarely transition to formality, and continue their existence, often for years
or even decades, without much growth or improvement. Fifth, as countries grow
and develop, the informal economy eventually shrinks, and the formal economy
comes to dominate economic life.
7The full quote is:
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The historical and moral element also applies to relative wages. As noted by
Hicks (1975), it can be di¢ cult to achieve a general consensus on what is fair
and what is not. No system of wages, Hicks argues,
when it is called into question, will ever be found to be fair. ... [To
avoid the system being called into question] the system of wages
should be well established, so that it has the sanction of custom. It
then becomes what is expected; and (admittedly on a low level of
fairness) what is expected is fair (p. 65).
The prevailing relative-wage norms, according to this argument, reect ac-
tual patterns in the past. Current levels of inequality in the US with CEOs in
large corporations pulling down pay that is 2-300 times higher than the average
worker would have seemed completely beyond the pale in 1970 when the average
ratio was about 20. The current ratio may still be o¤ensive, but the gradual in-
crease over the last 50 years has had a numbing e¤ect, and demands for a return
to the 1970-levels of wage inequality would be seen by many as extremely radi-
cal. Most CEOs certainly would consider reductions of that magnitude grossly
unfair; they have had no problem convincing themselves that their high pay is
the just reward for superior skills.8
The gradual adjustment of notions of fairness nds support in social psy-
chology and behavioral economics:
Psychological studies of adaptation suggest that any stable state of
a¤airs tends to become accepted eventually, at least in the sense
that alternatives to it no longer readily come to mind. ... Thus,
the gap between the behaviour that people consider fair and the
behavior that they expect in the market-place tends to be rather
small. (Kahneman et al. 1986, pp. 730-1)
As a simple formal representation of this behavioral evidence, suppose that the
fair wage ratio changes over time in response to di¤erences between actual and






In contradistinction therefore to the case of other commodities, there enters into
the determination of the value of labour-power a historical and moral element.
Nevertheless, in a given country, at a given period, the average quantity of the
means of subsistence necessary for the labourer is practically known. (Marx
1867 [1906], p. 190)
Marxs analysis focused on the real wage and the conict between capitalists and workers.
As noted above, equation (11) could be extended to include an e¤ect of prot shares on target
real wages.
8Skott and Guy (2013) discuss the rise in CEO pay.
9Similar specications have been used by Skott (2005) and Martins and Skott (2021). The
symmetric specication in equation (28) has the virtue of simplicity but misses an important
aspect of norm adjustment: fairness norms are likely to adjust quickly in an upward direction
(we quickly feel that pay increases are fair) but more slowly in a downward direction (it
is hard to accept that we deserve less than what we used to get). This asymmetry in the
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where  is the adjustment speed for the target relative wage.
The specication in equation (28) is quite mechanical and leaves out many
factors that may inuence workersaspirations and their willingness and abil-
ity to ght for wage increases. Institutional factors and labor market legislation
can be critical, and workersmilitancy, more generally, cannot be separated from
broader political and social movements; aggressive wage demands and high and
rising strike activity in the US, western Europe and many other countries in
the late 1960s did not develop independently of a general radicalization involv-
ing civil rights movements, anti-Vietnam war movements, student protests and
rising opposition against dictatorships and oppression in many countries. With
these caveats, however, equation (28) captures one, potentially important mech-
anism in the formation of wage aspirations.
In mature economies, the path dependency of wage aspirations and fairness
norms creates employment hysteresis and undermines the notion of a natural
rate of unemployment (Skott 2005). The consequences are even more radical
in dual economies: distributional conict need not prevent increases in eco-
nomic growth and the expansion of the modern sector if wage aspirations are
endogenous.
To see this, consider a trajectory in which the wage ratio wM=wA is kept
slightly below the fair ratio. Both the fair and the actual wage premium in
the formal sector gradually decline along this trajectory, thereby raising the
employment share of the formal sector in equation (20). It may be objected
that any discrepancy between fair and actual wages makes average incomes in
the informal sector rise faster than expected wage ination. Income expectations
will be adjusted, and equations (12) and (13) imply that persistent deviations
from fairness, even if small, will start a process of explosive ination as predicted
by natural-rate theory. This, indeed, was the result derived in equation (21).
The empirical support for the behavioral assumptions behind equations (12)-
(13) is weak, however. The fairness and acceptability of a wage o¤er can be
assessed in nominal or real terms. Shar et al. (1997) suggest that both frames
of reference will be applied and that the weight attached to the nominal frame
is context dependent. Applying these general principles to the present context,
ination loses its saliency if the rate of ination is low; the costs of ignoring
ination become minimal and there is no reason to keep close track of the
movements in ination. Consistent with this perspective, surveys show that
most respondents in low-ination countries pay little attention to ination and
have a poor knowledge of current ination rates.10
adjustment of norms in combination with downward stickiness in nominal wages can make for
inationary pressures, even if average relative wages are trendless; volatility tends to raise the
ination rate.
10Using New Zealand survey data on ination expectations, Coibon et al. (2018) nd that
many
rms view ination as relatively unimportant to their business decisions and
choose not to track its recent values, leading to large misperceptions about re-
cent ination dynamics and forecasts that are far out of line with historical
values, even though they display signicant knowledge about industry-specic
price changes. (p. 2711)
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Rowthorn (1977) anticipated these ndings, suggesting that wage setters will
ignore expected ination as long as it stays below a threshold level. Rowthorns
analysis focused on real wages and the extent to which expected price ination
a¤ects the growth rate of nominal wages. His argument can be adapted to





  1) + f(x) (29)
As in section 2, formal sector workers have a target for relative wages but 
following Shar et al. and Rowthorn low levels of expected growth tend to be
ignored. This behavioral e¤ect is captured by the f function which is taken to
be smooth (di¤erentiable, except for a kink at x = k and possibly at x = 0) and
to satisfy the conditions
f(x) = 0 for x  0 (30)
f(x) = x for x  k (31)
f 0  0 (32)
f 00(x) > 0 for 0 < x < k (33)
The continuous, sigmoid shaped f function generalizes Rowthorns thresh-
old specication. Distinguishing between expectedand anticipatedination,
Rowthorn assumed that anticipated ination (which inuences wage setting in
his one-sector model and corresponds to f(x) in this setting) is zero if expected
ination is below a threshold value but jumps to the expected value if expected
ination is above the threshold; that is, a Rowthorn specication has f(x) = 0
below the threshold and f(x) = x above the threshold (see Figure 1).
Consequently, there are signicant di¤erences between rms average beliefs and those of
professional forecasters.
In another study, Jonsson and Osterholm (2012) examine ination expectations in Sweden.
The Swedish central bank uses survey measures of ination expectations as one input to
its policy decisions. The surveys show that expectations are neither unbiased (the forecasts
have systematic errors) nor e¢ cient (readily available macroeconomic data could improve the
forecasts).
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Figure 1a: Smooth f function Figure 1b: Rowthorn specication
3.2 Implications
Consider rst the implications of successful ination targeting; that is, assume
that policy is adjusted to keep ination at a target level, p̂ = p̂T . It can be shown
that for intermediate values of the target the employment share of the formal
sector (
) will be increasing steadily and the wage premium in the modern
sector will be decreasing. Formally, we have (see Appendix A)





̂ > 0 for 0 < ŵTM < k
The speed of transformation (
̂), moreover, has a unique local (and global)
maximum for some value  in the interval (0; k); the speed is increasing in the
ination target for 0 < ŵTM <  and decreasing for  < ŵ
T
M < k: Modest rates
of (constant) ination facilitate economic development; very high (constant)
rates hurt growth and development. The falling wage premium and rising share
of the formal sector must come to halt when the wage premium hits zero (or
some lower bound) and the labor supply to formal sector ceases to be elastic.
In developing economies with large amounts of underemployment, however, the
process can proceed for a long time before hitting the lower bound, and to
simplify the exposition the bound was not included explicitly in equation (28).
As another experiment, suppose that relative incomes are subjected to a
large shock. In this simple model, the relative wage is determined by equation
(17), and the shock can only come from an increase in the share of consumption
going to the informal sector. In a more general setting, the shock could arise
from shifts in scal policy or from a commodity boom in a resource-rich economy
(see Martins and Skott 2021). Whatever the source of the shock, ination will
increase if the trajectory of 
 is kept unchanged despite the shock to relative
incomes.
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As shown in Appendix B, if 
̂ =  > 0 is constant, we have a 2D system of
di¤erential equations in x and (wA=wM ):
_x = [ + (
wA
wM






  1) +  (35)
The system may have two, one or no stationary points. Figure 2 depicts a phase
diagram for the 2D system (34)-(35) for the case with two stationary solutions;
one of them (E1) is locally stable, the other (E2) is a saddle point.






Suppose that initially the economy is at the locally stable stationary point E1




̂ =  > 0 and that, starting from this position,
at time t0 there is a positive shock to the relative wage of workers in the informal
sector. The fair wage ratio  is predetermined and the shock to the relative wage
translates into a positive shock to the level of the aspiration gapwA=wM . If,
as seems likely, the adjustment of aspirations is slow (a low value of ), a large
shock to relative wages may take the economy on a path of explosive ination
with x ! 1 as in Figure 3: the shock at time t0 has displaced the economy
from E1 to P; and with a slow adjustment speed ; the system now follows a
steep, divergent trajectory. As x diverges we have f(x) ! 1; ŵM ! 1 and
p̂!1.
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Figure 3: Divergent ination following shock to relative
wages
The dynamics of x and (wA=wM ) also imply that once expected ination
has risen above the threshold k, an absolute decline in 
 is needed to reduce
ination expectations. Above the threshold we have (equation (34))






̂ = 0 implies that wAwM will converge to 1 from above (equation (35) and
_x will converge to 0 from above. Thus, to combat ination and achieve a decline
in x, a reduction in the employment share of the modern sector is needed. A
shock to relative wages and the ensuing ination has led to deindustrialization.
4 Conclusion
Economists are often careless about specifying the domains of applicability of
their theories, but the indiscriminate application of DSGE and other main-
stream macroeconomic models to developing economies still seems surprising.
The development problem is all about structural transformation and the grad-
ual elimination of underemployment in low-productivity sectors of the economy.
By focusing on uctuations around a steady growth path with unemployment
at the natural rate, the models preclude the analysis of these central issues
facing developing countries.
O¢ cial unemployment rates are largely uninformative, but Phillips curves
and notions of a natural rate of unemploymentwhich can also be questioned
for mature economies  fail the basic smell test when it comes to developing
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economies. This leaves open the sources of ination, and structuralist theories
that emphasize distributional conict and cross-sectoral interactions have tried
to ll the gap. This paper has followed the same basic approach but with a
couple of twists.
It is useful, as a rst approximation, to divide the economy into two sectors,
a modernsector with high productivity and a second sector with low produc-
tivity and underemployment. One twist concerns the delineation of the sectors.
The second sector has typically been seen as agriculture. For many countries,
however, it may be more useful to dene the second sector as an informal, urban
sector. This reformulation makes it unlikely that the expansion of the modern
sector will be held back by inelastic supplies of essential goods produced by
the second sector. Consequently, boosts to productivity in the second sector
will not accelerate the transformation process; it may not even raise average
informal-sector incomes but simply increase underemployment.
The more important twist concerns the way distributional conict is mod-
eled. As in other structuralist models, ination emerges as a result of distribu-
tional claims that are mutually inconsistent. But the claims and the underlying
income norms and aspirations are path dependent predetermined in the short
run but evolving endogenously in the medium and long run. This conventional
or historical element in wage aspirations negates the idea of natural rates of un-
deremployment. Economic development and the gradual reduction of the wage
premium in the formal sector need not be blocked by immutable distributional
conict.
Relative wage norms and aspirations are important, but behavioral evidence
indicates that aspirations are path dependent and that low growth rates of av-
erage nominal incomes in the informal sector are unlikely to be transmitted
fully to wage ination in the formal sector. These behavioral ndings imply
that the gradual elimination of underemployment in the informal sector as the
modern sector expands need not produce ever-increasing ination. The devel-
opment process may be facilitated by modest amounts of ination, and strict
ination targeting can present a barrier to economic development, but the in-
ation process need not become explosive. Matters are very di¤erent following
a large shock to relative incomes. The adjustment of aspirations is likely to be
slow, and in the absence of a retrenchment of the modern sector, the inationary
consequences of large shocks to relative income could be severe.
For simplicity the analysis in this paper has focused on a closed economy with
two sectors. The basic idea carries over to more general settings. Martins and
Skott (2021) present an extended four-sector model of an open economy. Exter-
nal shocks that a¤ect aggregate demand (and thereby the demand-determined
income of workers in the informal sector) become a source of ination and, ap-
plying the model to the commodity boom of the early 2000s, the analysis shows
how orthodox macroeconomic policies of ination targeting and balanced gov-
ernment budgets produce exchange rate appreciation and deindustrialization in
a resource-rich economy.11 Martins and Skott (2021) focus primarily on mon-
11Monetary policy can inuence aggregate demand and ination is several ways. There is
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etary policy; see Skott (2021a) for an analysis of scal policy and functional
nancein developing economies.
The main conclusions of this paper echo Ross (1989) position. Discussing
the role of distributional conict in ination, Ros distinguishes between inertial
ination and pure conict ination. Inertial ination arises because
economic agents require time to adjust their aspirations to changed
circumstances and ... it is through adaptation that the target real
wage adjusts to present wages (p. 6)
Inertial aspirations are clearly analogous to the adjustment process in section
3, and Ros goes on to argue that a general conict theory of ination
would recognize the importance of adaptation processes in the de-
termination of economic agentstargets, especially in the presence
of minor or moderate shocks; but it would also be willing to accept
that, in the face of large shocks leading to sharp reductions in real
wages and to substantial aspiration gaps, adaptation may be incom-
plete or too slow to avoid making ination an inherently unstable
process. (p.11)
Ross framework in the 1989-paper did not include multiple sectors, and he
focused on the real wage rate rather than relative wages. But if real wages
were replaced by relative wages, his statement could stand as a summary of
the conclusions in this paper.
Appendix A: Ination targets and the pace of
structural transformation
Successful ination targeting requires that p̂ = p̂T where p̂T is the target. Using
equation (14) this condition translates into targets for p̂M and ŵM :
ŵTM = 
 1(p̂T ) + q̂
where q is the rate of growth of labor productivity in the formal sector. Thus,
using equations (29) and (17), we must have
ŵTM = ŵM = (
wA
wM
  1) + f(x) = (
1  

  1) + f(x)












general consensus that many of the channels are weak in developing and emerging market
economies but that the exchange rate channel is important; see Ros (2015) for a discussion
of the Mexican case.
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From equation (36) it follows that

̂ =  ̂  f
0(x) _x






Combining equations (13),(17) and (37), the dynamic equation for x can
now be written
_x = (ŵA   x) = (











) _x = ( ̂+ ŵTM   x)





) _x = ( ̂+ ŵTM   x)
= [ ( wM
wA






(ŵTM   f(x)) + ŵTM   x]
= [
ŵTM   f(x)
ŵTM   f(x) + 
+ ŵTM   x] (38)
The coe¢ cient on _x on the left-hand side of equation (38) is greater than 1 and
the right-hand side is increasing in ŵTM and decreasing in x: It follows that x
will converge to a stationary solution x with
x = x(ŵTM ); x
0 > 0















The shape of the f function (see equations (30)-(33)) implies that if ŵTM = 0
or ŵTM  k; the stationarity condition for x requires that




) = 1 (39)
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But for intermediate values of the target if 0 < ŵTM < k we have
x > ŵTM > f(x
)
ŵTM   f(x) > 0
The long-run rate of growth of 






=  ̂ =  ( wM
wA
 1) = [1  1
(wAwM )
 ] = [1 

ŵTM   f(x) + 
] (40)
It follows from equation (40) that the speed of transformation (the growth in the
share of formal-sector employment) is an increasing function of (ŵTM   f(x))
Thus,





̂ > 0 for 0 < ŵTM < k
The sigmoid shape of the f function also implies that ŵTM  f(x) will have
a unique local (and global) maximum for some value  in this interval. Thus,
the speed of transformation is increasing in the ination target for 0 < ŵTM < 
and decreasing for  < ŵTM < k:
Appendix B: Dynamic system for the aspiration
gap and expected growth of informal-sector in-
come
If policy makers maintain a constant pace of development keep 
̂ =   0 
the dynamics of (wA=wM ) and x can be written (using (17), (29) and (28))
_x = (ŵA   x) = (
̂ + ŵM   x) = [ + (
wA
wM
  1) + f(x)  x](41)
dwA
wM




  1) +  (42)
This 2D system of di¤erential equations two, one or no stationary solutions. To
see this note that equation (42) is a self-contained di¤erential equation with a





=   (assuming that  < ;
if  > ; the equation implies that wAwM ! 1 for any positive initial value ofwA
wM
). Substituting wAwM = (
wA
wM
) into the stationarity condition for x, we get






The expression on the right hand side of equation (43) is unambiguously positive,
and the conditions (30)-(33) imply that the function x  f(x) on the left-hand
21
side of the equation attains a positive maximum at some x = ~x with 0 < ~x < k
and that x  f(x) = 0 for x  0 or x  k. Thus, the equation has two solutions
















  1): Figure 2 depicts the phase
diagram for the 2D system (41)-(42) for the case with two stationary solutions;
one of them (E1) is locally stable, the other (E2) is a saddle point.
Suppose that initially the economy is at the locally stable stationary point
E1 with x = x; (
wA
wM
) = (wAwM )
; 
̂ =  > 0 and that, starting from this
position, at time t0 there is a positive shock to the relative wage of workers in
the informal sector. The wage ratio wA=wM jumps to a higher value and then,
following the shock, evolves in accordance with equation (17); that is, after the
shock
ŵA   ŵM = 
̂ = 
The fair wage ratio  is predetermined and the shock to the relative wage
translates into a positive shock to the level of aspiration gap wA=wM . The
endogeneity of the  implies that the gap will come back to its initial steady-
growth value but the convergence may be slow. The shock has no direct e¤ects
on the level of x but a¤ects the rate change in x. The inationary implications
of the shock are best seen by looking at the phase diagram in gure 3. The
stationary solution at E1 is locally stable but a large shock to relative wages
in combination with slow adjustments of aspirations may take the economy on
path of explosive ination with x ! 1: As x diverges we also have f(x) !
1; ŵM !1 and p̂!1.
References
[1] Akerlof, George A. (1982) "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange".
Quarterly Journal of Economics 97:543-569.
[2] Akerlof, G.A., Yellen, J.L. (1990)"The fair wage-e¤ort hypothesis and un-
employment". Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 254-283.
[3] Bewley, T.F. (1999) Why wages dont fall during a recession. Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press.
[4] Blanchard, O.J. (2016) "The Phillips Curve: Back to the 60s?" American
Economic Review, 106(5), pp. 31-34.
[5] Bleaney, M. and Francisco, M. (2018) "Is the Phillips curve di¤erent in
poor countries?". Bulletin of Economic Research, 70(1), pp. E17-E28.
[6] Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y. and Kumar, S. (2018) "How Do Firms
Form Their Expectations? New Survey Evidence". American Economic
Review, 108(9), pp. 26712713
22
[7] Friedman, M. (1968) "The Role of Monetary Policy". American Economic
Review, 58(1) (March), pp. 1-17
[8] Hicks, J. (1975) The crisis in Keynesian economics. Blackwell, Oxford.
[9] Jonsson, T. and Österholm, P. (2012) "The properties of survey-based in-
ation expectations in Sweden" Empirical Economics 42, pp.7994.
[10] Kahneman, D. Knetsch, J.L., Thaler, R. (1986) "Fairness as a constraint
on prot seeking: entitlements in the market". American Economic Review
76, 728-741.
[11] La Porta, R. and Shleifer, A. (2014) "Informality and development". Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 28(3), pp. 109-126.
[12] Maka, A. and Barbosa, F. (2013) "Phillips curves: An encompassing test".
XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia (ANPEC).
[13] Mankiw, G. (2001) "The Inexorable and Mysterious Tradeo¤ Between In-
ation and Unemployment". Economic Journal, 111, Issue 471, pp. 45-61.
[14] Martins, G.K. and Skott. P. (2021) "Macroeconomic policy, ination and
deindustrialization in a dual economy". Industrial and Corporate Change,
forthcoming.
[15] Marx, K. (1867 [1906]). Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1.
The Modern Library, New York.
[16] Noyola, J.F. (1956) "Ination in Chile: an unorthodox approach". Inter-
national Economic Papers 10, pp. 603-648.
[17] Phelps. E.S. (1967) "Phillips Curves, Expectations of Ination and Optimal
Unemployment over Time". Economica, 34(135), pp. 254-281
[18] Ros, J. (1989) "On inertia, social conict, and the structuralist analysis of
ination". Kellogg Institute Working Paper #128
[19] Ros, J. (2013) Rethinking economic development, growth and institutions.
Oxford University Press.
[20] Ros, J. (2015) "Central bank policies in Mexico: targets, instruments, and
performance". Comparative Economic Studies, 57, pp. 483-510.
[21] Rowthorn, R. (1977). "Conict, Ination and Money". Cambridge Journal
of Economics, 1, pp. 215-39.
[22] Seers, D. (1962) "A Theory of Ination and Growth in Under-Developed
Economies Based on the Experience of Latin America". Oxford Economic
Papers, 14 (June), pp. 17495.
[23] Shar, E., Diamond, P., Tversky, A. (1997) "Money illusion". Quarterly
Journal of Economics 112, 341-374.
23
[24] Skott, P. (2005) "Fairness as a source of hysteresis in employment and
relative wages". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 57, pp.
305331.
[25] Skott, P. (2021a) "Fiscal policy and structural transformation in developing
economies". Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 56, pp. 129-140.
[26] Skott, P. and Guy, F. (2013) Power, Luck and Ideology in a Model of
Executive Pay". UMass Working Paper 2013-01
[27] Sunkel, O. (1958) "La inacion Chilena: un enfoque heterodoxo. El
Trimestre Economico, 25, pp. 107-131
24
